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Orza: The Perception and Reality of Discipline in Sports

THE PERCEPTION AND REALITY OF DISCIPLINE
IN SPORTS
Gene Orza*

I. INTRODUCTION

There is a general public perception that in sports unions have had
a great deal of success in ameliorating club discipline of professional
athletes, particularly in baseball.' The perception differs somewhat from
reality. True, there are many famous cases in which unions, in varying
degrees, have been successful-Lamarr Hoyt,2 Steve Howe,3 Latrell
Sprewell4 -and, of course, there are some not so famous cases, but
written about nonetheless,5 that illustrate the principle.
But we should not automatically assume that the famous, or high
profile cases are representative of the entire class. What success unions
have had in ameliorating club discipline is attributable, in my estimation, to four primary considerations that are at work more feverishly, or
with greater intensity, in the more public cases than in the run-of-themill disciplinary cases that are just as much a part of the industry's law
of the shop, even if not as well known to the layperson.
* Gene Orza is the Associate General Counsel of the Major League Baseball Players Association and has a strong NLRB background. This essay is adapted from Mr. Orza's address at the
1999 New York State Bar Association's Labor and Employment Law Section's Meeting held in
Cooperstown, New York.
1. See generally Wayne R. Cohen, Comment, The RelationshipBetween CriminalLiability
and Sports: A JursiprudentialInvestigation, 7 U. MtAM ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 311, 313 (1990)
(stating that baseball is "usually considered the sport least conducive to violence" despite the fact
that it uses "two of the most dangerous weapons in professional sports-a bat and a ball").
2. In re Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. San Diego Padres Baseball Club, Panel
Decision No. 74, 548 PL/PAT 623 (1987) (Nicolau, Arb.) [hereinafter Hoyt Arbitration].
3. In re Major League Basketball Players Ass'n v. Commissioner of Major League Baseball, Panel Decision 94, 548 PL/PAT 539 (1992) (Nicolau, Arb.) [hereinafter Howe Arbitration].
4. In re National Basketball Players Ass'n et al., Opinion and Award 11-12, 548 PLI/PAT
429 (1998) (Feerick, Arb.) [hereinafter Sprewell Arbitration].
5. See generally Jeffrey S. Moorad, Major League Baseball's Labor Turmoil: The Failure
of the Counter-Revolution,4 VmL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 54 (1997) (discussing the rise of labor
disputes due to the "advent of collective bargaining").
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11. SPECIAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN SPORTS DISCIPLINE

First, sports in general, and especially baseball, have invested an
abundance of intellectual capital in convincing the consumer that professional athletes are special people-special human beings. "Come
watch baseball games," the baseball industry said at the turn of the century. "Baseball players are really great Americans." The industry advertised baseball as far back as the early 1900s as having players that are
better than the average American. As a result of this tradition, baseball
is extremely sensitive to consumer criticism and many disciplinary decisions are made in direct response to fan outrage or fan concern, 6 no
matter how brutish or unfamiliar with either the real facts or the real issues the outrage or concern may be. The result frequently is a higher
level of discipline imposed on a player than would otherwise be the
case,7 simply because lots of fans know about the matter and are complaining about it. This raises the possibility of the punishment not fitting
the crime, because it responds not to the offense as much as the public's
perception of how egregious the crime is. It is a matter, I believe, to
which arbitrators are sensitive.
The "just cause principle," of course, does not bar an employer
from taking into account the public view, or the potential impact on
consumers of the behavior in question! But when the amount of the
discipline itself represents a major shift in focus away from the deed of
the player to the public's reaction to the deed, arbitrators seem particularly sensitive to that phenomenon. 9 It represents, in their judgment, too
great of a departure from the standard, and too great a shift in focus
away from the deed of the offending party to the outrage of the population.
Second, free agency is not a privilege as my friend Rob suggests.'0
Free agency really is just a synonym for citizenship. All free agency
really means is that a player is allowed to work someplace else in his

6. See Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 4, at 519-20 (discussing how the integrity of sports
and public confidence are directly related to the public's perception).
7. See Jason M. Pollack, Note, Take My Arbitrator,Please: Commissioner "Best Interests"
DisciplinaryAuthority in ProfessionalSports, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1645, 1702 (1999) (discussing
the severe penalties imposed on an NBA player for physical assault).
8. See Hoyt Arbitration, supranote 2, at 632; see also Pollack, supra note 7, at 1702.
9. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 1695-96.
10. See Susan H. Seabury, The Development and Role of Free Agency in Major League
Baseball, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 335, 378-79 (1998).
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current industry.1 My father, for example, worked for a dress company.
We never called him a free agent. If he was fired, he had the opportunity
to work at a different dress company. He was an American. Arbitrators
are sensitive to the fact that in baseball, and in other sports, but in baseball in particular, the clubs have this anti-trust immunity,'2 which has effectively locked up the industry in which players perform their job. Told
by employers in the industry that it is unitary by virtue of an anti-trust
exemption, arbitrators hold employers to a higher standard when their
discipline effects a player's entitlement to go elsewhere and work. 3 In
effect, they say to the clubs, when a player is suspended for five days
and the player has no choice of working elsewhere in the industry, "you
had better be right on this one." What, after all, is the player going to
do? Playing baseball is what he does for a living. He is not a carpenter
or a truck driver (not that being a carpenter or truck driver is not a noble
profession). Sensitivity to the consequences of this asserted anti-trust
immunity is, I believe, definitely something that finds its way into arbitrators' decisions, 4 particularly on the severity question that is part of
the just cause analysis.
Third, arbitrators are aware, particularly when cases involve sportsrelated misconduct, and by that I mean to distinguish between private
misconduct, where, for example, a player robs a car and job-related misconduct, where, for example, a player has a fight with a manager or another player or even a fan, 5 that sports culture expects of its athletes a
certain degree of intensity. The industry wants its athletes to be tough
because its consumers do. Those consumers do not want the sport's
athletes to be laid back, contemplative, thoughtful, or debate in metaphysics with those around them. Arbitrators are sensitive to this, to the
proposition that what might represent misconduct elsewhere might be
more understandable, even predictable, in the field of professional ath-

11. See, e.g., id. at 351-55 (discussing free agency in baseball and explaining the history
behind Jim "Catfish" Hunter, who was the first "free agent" in modem baseball, who gained his
free agency freedom in 1974 allowing him the freedom to negotiate with any Major League team).
12. See generally J. Philip Calabrese, Recent Legislation, Antitrust and Baseball, 36 HARV.
J. LEGIS. 531,536 (1999).
13. See Marc Chalpin, Comment, It Ain't Over 'Til It's Over: The Century Long Conflict
Between the Owners and the Players In Major League Baseball, 60 ALB. L. REV. 205, 221-23
(1996).
14. See generally Frederick N. Donegan, Examining the Role of Arbitrationin Professional
Baseball, 1 SPORTS LJ.183, 196-97 (1994) (discussing the overturning of Howe's lifetime ban).
15. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 313 (stating that violence that occurs in the sports arena
"does not threaten the public in the same way as off-the-field violence").
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letics.
Finally, there is a certain privilege that athletes have which practitioners and some arbitrators do not fail to recognize, even if outside observers seldom if ever do, and it is a characteristic that makes athletes a
bit more insulated from the heavy discipline to which other employees
may be subject. 6 Disciplining athletes demonstratively hurts other innocent athletes.' 7 For example, if an arbitrator were to suspend Cal Ripken
from playing baseball, the arbitrator is also injuring B.J. Surhoff. In
other words, the entire team of the suspended player gets hurt.'" There
seems to be some sensitivity among arbitrators to this phenomenon, and
one arbitrator has written about this feature of discipline and in so doing
alluded to how the industry itself seems to embrace it in its own doling
out of discipline at times.
The most glaring example, of the interplay of all these considerations, may be the Sprewell case, 9 in which I testified (which may be
why the arbitrator only reduced the amount of the discipline and didn't
eliminate it altogether). However, in Sprewell's case, the taking of
Sprewell away from his teammates probably was a consideration. So
was the fact that Sprewell, at the time of the incident, was playing hard
and hot, with all this yelling, and coaches screaming, and teammates
pushing. And so is the fact that by virtue of basketball being the only
basketball game in town, Sprewell is being told "you are fired, and after
you are fired you are suspended." So he can't work anywhere. Think
about it. In Sprewell, the Commissioner of Basketball suspended the
employee after he was fired.' Such a decision is not likely to be replicated in any other industry. How could it be? The reason for taking such
an unusual action - suspending an employee after he had already been
fired - was that the Commissioner had to guard against other clubs hiring Sprewell after his termination. 2' Another club's hiring of Sprewell
would have sent a strong message to the sports world which the Commissioner didn't want sent, namely, but importantly, that what Sprewell
did wasn't quite as outrageous as was being suggested, the other team
16. See, e.g., Pollack, supra note 7, at 1701 (discussing Feerick's concerns regarding the
Warrior's December 1, 1997 incident and the lack of questioning their own players).
17. See Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 4, at 464; see also Powers et al., What Punishment
ForStranglingthe Boss?, 2 No. 12 R.I. EMPL. L. LErrER 8 (1998).
18. See Sprewell Arbitration, supranote 4, at 464.

19. See id. at 429.
20. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 1699-1700; Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 4, at 464.
21. See Powers, supranote 17, at 8 ("[T]he league suspended Sprewell for one year, preventing him from signing with another team.").
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effectively saying: "we know he did something bad, but not bad enough
for us not to sign him to our team."
Finally, there was also a tremendous fan reaction to the Sprewell
case that almost required the league to discipline Sprewell at a level that
far exceeded any other penalty ever administered to an NBA player in
the history of the sport,' and that characteristic surely found its way into
arbitrator Feerick's consideration of the case.
I began, however, by suggesting that the special attributes of sports
cases notwithstanding, there is a whole lot that is the same in sports as
elsewhere. Everything that is done in baseball, like many other sports, is
done in the proverbial fish bowl. Its exemplified by the sports writers
who call up at all hours of the night to ask us the most ridiculously absurd questions, the timing of which would defy any reasonably dispassionate analysis, but everything we do looms larger to writers and readers.
Yet hundreds of ordinary, everyday disciplinary, decisions are
reached which do not generate substantial public clamor. Many more
are settled than the public will ever know. Many more cases are withdrawn than are heard, even when a grievance or appeal is actually filed.
There are also many kinds of potential grievances on all fronts that actually result in simple hand shake agreements or notes to each other effectively saying "okay, we'll treat it this way and in the future, we'll
fight about it on a different day if we have to." These cases, in which the
clubs' degree of success is much, much higher, represent much more of
what is actually done by attorneys for the league and attorneys for the
players' union in the area of discipline, actual and potential.
The public perception though is based on the exceptional, particularly in baseball. And it is that the union and management are always
fighting about things, in fact about everything. But, in reality, every day
of the week not only on a disciplinary level but on a purely contractual
level as well, most of what takes place in the baseball industry is not
much different from what goes on in any other mature industry with regard to its handling of labor issues. Having said that, it should be mentioned that baseball is not truly a mature industry when it comes to its
labor relations. The sport, first, has only been organized for about thirtythree years.' That only amounts to one generation of sports fans. Sec22. See Sprewell Arbitration, supra note 4, at 444; see also Pollack, supra note 7, at 1700.
23. See Cleta Deatherage Mitchell, The Rise of America's Two NationalPastimes: Baseball
and the Law, 97 MicH. L. REv. 2042, 2047 (1999) (discussing that in a series of Congressional
hearings that ended in 1965, Congress examined baseball's organizational structure and how base-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1999

5

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1999], Art. 6
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 17:139

ond, baseball is far different in the later stages of its relationship with
the players and their union than it was in earlier stages of the relationship. The big fight over free agency that came to fruition in 1976,24
really culminated in a 1981 baseball strike. That strike caused a new relationship between the union and the sport. But if you date from that relationship between the union and the clubs, you see that it is only an
eighteen year relationship, almost adolescent. This maturation process
is, as you know, important in the establishment of professional, pragmatic and positive labor relations. It will mean, over time, that more and
more cases will receive the quiet treatment that most cases do already
and that fewer and fewer cases will result from the overreaching that
sometimes occurs.
I. CONCLUSION
In sum, there are differences between the baseball industry and
others, particularly in the disciplinary arena. Also, I believe that arbitrators are sensitive to these differences. But while that sensitivity may
have given rise to a wide public perception that unions have had a remarkable success rate in overturning the discipline of athletes, it is, a
perception that is a bit off the mark, and one that over time will become
less widespread.

ball decisions were made).
24. See generally Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp. v. Major League Baseball Players
Ass'n, 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976). In 1976, the Kansas City Royals brought an action against the
Players Association seeking to set aside an arbitration panel's decision granting free agency to two
players who had played out their renewal contracts. See id. at 617. The court held that the arbitration agreement between the Players Association and Major League Baseball was broad enough to

cover the dispute. See id.
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